died or changed their way of life. This fact lies behind the great drop in the number of Kazakh nomadic households, from 567,000 in 1930 to one-fourth that amount, 158,000, in 1935.

It will be recalled that between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population suffered an absolute loss of 900,000, and a projected loss of 1,400,000, figured on the 15.9 average rate of increase for the entire Soviet Union. The major factors which contributed to this decline may now be summarized:

(1) Starvation through loss of herds during the period of the first great collectivization drive, 1929-1933.
(2) The poor conditions of life and the prevalence of famine and disease during the early period of collectivization.
(3) Mass arrests and liquidations of resisters to collectivization ("enemies of the people").
(4) Border crossings by Kazakhs into Sinkiang and Mongolia.
(5) Kazakh migration to the neighboring Turkic peoples, primarily the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks.
(6) Russification of Kazakhs who moved to the new urban developments of southern Siberia.

The population losses in any single category cannot be estimated with accuracy; one can only list those factors contributing to population loss with comments about their relative significance. The major factor was undoubtedly starvation through loss of herds and through the conditions attending collectivization. The flight across the borders into countries outside the USSR is a dramatic factor, but not one which accounts for large numbers. There are no signs of a great increase in the population of Sinkiang, for example, in the early 1930's. The total population of Sinkiang is small, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of people could not have passed unnoticed, especially since there were western observers in the area at the time.

The movement of Kazakhs into the cities of southern Siberia, presumably in the Urals and the Kuzbass, is the official Russian explanation. This explanation cannot be the whole story but must be accepted as a part of the truth. That is, Kazakhs who are urbanized, speak Russian habitually, and work in Russian factories seek a Russian nationality listing. They have been encouraged to do so at certain periods of Soviet history, primarily in the 1930's.

The factor of GPU arrests and liquidation, together with attendant factors such as starvation among those who were not themselves liquidated but whose herds were, may account for a maximum of 125,000 Kazakhs. The last major factor is the flight of Kazakhs to other neighboring nationalities. A minor factor related to this last is the low rate of increase among those Kazakhs resident in areas outside Kazakhstan.

KAZAKH POPULATION IN 1939

A total of 3,100,000 Kazakhs was listed for the USSR as a whole in the 1939 census. Approximately 84 per cent were resident in Kazakhstan, nearly 10 per cent lived in Uzbekistan and Karakalpakia, and the rest

K 177 life of the republic. There is reason to doubt the population picture provided by Soviet figures. Since polygamy is illegal in the Soviet Union, polygamous marriages are carefully concealed from the Soviet registry. A recent ethnographic report notes that registration of marriage is far from general among the Kazakhs. There are cases in which birth registration has been delayed in order to register children by one wife in the name of another—another Kazakh device designed to circumvent the prohibition of polygamy. Similarly, practices such as leviratic marriage are maintained, concealed as much as possible from the Soviet authorities.[1]

K 114 177 The source for these data is a series of reports published in the past five years by the Soviet ethnographer, O.A. Korbe. He and his staff have advanced the thesis that Kazakh society in the Soviet period includes a number of institutions which have survived from pre-Soviet days. K [815] A rebuttal has been entered by another Soviet ethnographer, a Kazakh, Sabitov. Basing his report on field work in the summer of 1952, Sabitov seeks to show that rural Kazakhs have been transformed entirely by the process of Sovietization. His conclusions are supported by a certain amount of illustrative material; for example, he asserts that kolkhoz houses show Russian influence and that Russian craftsmen are employed for making stoves. Utensils used in daily life are for the most part contemporary in both design and production. Clothing, on the other hand, is in part traditional, in part modern.[2]

Sabitov's data are highly selective, for they concern only material culture—housing, dress, utensils. He merely states, without specific supporting data, that there have been changes in the social relations, the spiritual culture, and other aspects of Kazakh society. That there have been changes is obvious. Korbe stresses the traditional, the "survivals"; Sabitov stresses the new elements. Neither has examined the interrelations of Kazakh culture and society with the Russian.

K ● 369 Little information is available on Kazakhs living in cities. Those Kazakhs who have moved into urban areas apparently show little external KN [341] difference from their Russian neighbors. They live in houses of similar architecture; photographs of KSSR cities reveal a uniform type of architecture among the apartment houses and public buildings which is an amalgam of Central Asiatic and Russian designs. Plans for feeding the K [262] cities of Kazakhstan recognize no cultural differences (see Chapter 5 on Economy). The Russian food pattern predominates: potatoes, vegetables, meat, and milk products. Kazakh dietary customs exclude pork, KN [369] which is a typical Russian food carried by the Russians into Central Asia. One infers that segregation according to cultural background exists at least to a certain degree in the cities. The separation of Kazakhs from Russians is clearly not a public policy, nor is it a folk practice. The best explanation appears to be that the Kazakhs prefer to K [186] keep to themselves, and the Russians likewise.

This attitude of holding off is shown in the intermarriage pattern, K 177 186 or rather in the absence of one. The evidence is sparse, far from

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
[2] Sabitov, 1953, pp. 97-99.

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Chapter 4

RELIGION

THE MOSLEM RELIGION AND THE KAZAKHS

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The Turkic peoples of Central Asia—Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Kashgarian, Altai-Turk, Taranchi, and Sart—are divided by habitat and occupation regarding their religious practices and beliefs. The city-dwelling Turk and the farming Turk have been under Islamic influence for many centuries; the Turkic cities of Central Asia have been among the great centers of Islamic culture. The herdsmen of the Central Asiatic steppe, on the other hand, are Islamic only in circumscribed aspects of their religious life. There is an interplay between these two divisions, farmers and herders, which deserves careful treatment, for it is of especial significance today.

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No adequate survey of the religion of the Kazakhs has been made. This is unfortunate, for analysis of the various components of Kazakh religion is a complex task and one with profound significance to the purposes of psychological warfare and political understanding. There is a widespread belief among both scholars and laymen that the Kazakhs are Moslems, and should be treated accordingly. The roots of this belief lie in the past, along with certain errors regarding the language of the Kazakhs. About 80 years ago, the Russian Orientalist and political adviser V. Grigoriev, in an article entitled "Russian Policy in Asia," appended to Schuyler's Turkistan, wrote the following:[1]

> "We [Russians] imagined that the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] were the same ethnographically as our Volga Tartars, and therefore for one hundred and twenty years we carried on all our correspondence with them in the Tartar language in the full assurance that we were communicating with them in the native tongue which they fully understood while, in fact, it was exactly the same as writing to Spaniards in Italian. . . . Still worse results followed: another misunderstanding of ours was, that the Kirghiz were Mohammedans, whereas in the last [18th] were almost all Shamanists, and a large number of them remain so to this day. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few of the Khans and Sultans had a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and performed some few of its rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the Kirghiz Steppes, not a single mullah performed there the rites of the Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kirghiz have really become Mussulman to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for Mussulmans, and to our treating them as such. As incontrovertible proof that the

[1] Schuyler (110), Vol. 2, 1876, pp. 404-405.

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The situation in herding is similar.[1] The leading pastoral regions are in the western parts of Kazakhstan, the Guryev, West Kazakhstan, and Aktyubinsk regions. There has been a steady decline in cattle, sheep, and goats in the Guryev region from 1946 to 1953, which means that Kazakh herding in this region has not participated in the postwar recovery (Kazakhs form over two-thirds of the population of the Guryev region). A similar decline in cattle has been reported for West Kazakhstan and South Kazakhstan. In the regions of East and North Kazakhstan, cattle and sheep are below the prewar figures. Throughout the republic the ratio of cows to the total number of cattle in the kolkhoz herds is disproportionately low (24.3 per cent) and is falling; for instance, in the year 1952 the number of cows dropped by 10.8 per cent. Cattle have been falling in number from year to year in both collective and state farms.[2]

The milk yield per kolkhoz was lower in 1952 than in 1940.[3] This statement is an even graver admission than it seems at first glance, because the individual collective farm is larger in 1952 than it was in 1940 and there are fewer kolkhozy now than then.

In the same period, 1940-1952, the average milk yield per cow dropped 76 liters.[4] The average annual milk yield per cow for 1939 was 650 liters[5]; if it can be assumed that there was little change between 1939 and 1940, a fall of 13 per cent in milk production per cow is indicated for the 1940-1952 period.

Milk production is closely associated with the statistics of gravidity, and there has been a considerable decline in this category in Kazakhstan as well. In 1948, out of 100 cows 88 were with calf, while only 74 out of every 100 were with calf in 1951. Similarly, of every 100 mares, 78 were with foal in 1948; this figure had dropped to 67 in 1951.[6]

The area sown in livestock feed had fallen in 1952 below the prewar (1940) level; this reduction led to the critical situation regarding milk production, and that of meat and wool as well. Despite the tremendous gain in pork, total meat production fulfilled only 60 per cent of plan. The same ratio of 60 per cent holds for wool and cotton.[7] The situation regarding wool is particularly bad; the wool yield per sheep has fallen off even more sharply than the milk yield per cow. In the period 1940-1952 the annual wool yield per sheep fell from 2.4 to 1.9 kilograms, or 4.2 pounds, an over-all drop of 21 per cent.[8]

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On the one hand, the Kazakhs do not cooperate in the Soviet pattern of production; on the other, the Soviet emphases are such as to exclude the Kazakhs. For example, the stress on such alien foods as pork, potatoes, and garden vegetables, in the development of the urban pattern, means that as the Kazakh moves to the city he must give up many of his old food habits. And yet only in the city can one find higher learning.

[1] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[3] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[4] *Ibid.*, 4 Oct 52.
[5] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
[6] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[7] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

the only means by which, in the present context, the literary, artistic, and scientific expressions of Kazakh culture can develop. Kazakh economic life and material culture today are best described as reflecting a certain dispiritedness. This dispirited attitude underlies the apathy which allows skilled herdsmen to let their herds fall apart—failing to ensure that cows continue to calve, neglecting to shear their sheep, not bringing mares to foal.

These various facts bespeak an unwillingness on the Kazakhs' part to participate in the Soviet life as well as a holding-off policy by Moscow. In the field of native handicrafts a similar situation prevails. Kazakh craftsmen had until recently a degree of skill in rugmaking and felt-making (largely a woman's occupation), leatherwork, and certain metal crafts such as brassworking. These crafts they shared with other Central Asiatic peoples, both Turkic and Iranian. This has all disappeared. The Kazakhs have lost contact with their own culture; they have been forbidden to express interest in their own past.

The Kazakhs recovered splendidly from the losses of World War I and the Revolution, rebuilding their herding strength in the next decade. During this period they were left more or less alone by Moscow. During 1929-1933 the Kazakhs again suffered tremendous losses. In the ensuing period they were not left alone, and they have not recovered, even after 25 years. Never in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan has a plan for herding been fulfilled. In 1952 a partial exception did occur—the plan for horses was fulfilled—but only, according to Shaiakhmetov, through huge investments by the state.[1]

INDUSTRY

The industrial development of Kazakhstan has proceeded along the line of extraction of natural resources, primarily metals and fuels (see Figure 2). The metal extraction has a history which precedes the Revolution, and is almost exclusively in the field of nonferrous metals; to this day there is very little iron mining and ferrous industry in Kazakhstan.

The chief nonferrous metals are lead and zinc, mined in the Altai Mountains and near Taldy-Kurgan; copper, mined north of Lake Balkhash, in the vicinity of Dzhezkazgan, and between Akmolinsk and Pavlodar; and various deposits of manganese, bauxite, nickel, gold, phosphorus, chromite, and mineral salts. Iron is mined near the Sary-Su and at Kustanay.

Kazakhstan has both solid and liquid fuel resources. Large deposits of coal are scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the republic, from the Mangyshlak peninsula in the west to the Chinese border in the east; the most important, ranking third in the Soviet Union, is that at Karaganda. Lignite is found in the extreme south, at Lenger and Chimkent, but in small amounts relative to the solid fuels in the republic. Oil is found along the Caspian shore near the port of Guryev, and in the steppe between the Emba and Ural rivers.[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
[2] *Pal'gov*, 1953, pp. 126-135.

which borders the Karakalpak. Similarly, Kirgiz is differentiated from Kazakh by minor sound changes. Within Kazakhstan proper two dialects may be found which derive their respective labels from the way the word for "no" is pronounced: (1) jŏk (dzhok), in the eastern parts of the republic, and (2) zŏk (zhok), in the western and northern parts of Kazakhstan.

These are, however, minor differences. The main point is that for purposes of oral communication Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Karakalpak are so mutually intelligible as to form a single language.

In writing and printing, the Turks of Central Asia used the Arabic script until the 20th century. In the 1930's Soviet authorities introduced first the Latin and in 1939-1940 the Cyrillic alphabets, with certain necessary additions for each language. The resultant orthographies present slightly differing appearances for Kazakh and Kirgiz. This difference constitutes a handicap, even for educated readers, to those unaccustomed to reading printed matter in both languages. Nevertheless, after a little initial hesitation, a Kazakh reader will be able to make out the content of an article in an unfamiliar Kirgiz newspaper. The communicator trying to reach both Kirgiz and Kazakhs by means of a written or printed document in one of these languages should therefore be aware that he must provide some incentive to readers of the other language to expend the extra effort.

In delimiting a target group within the Kazakh SSR one should remember that Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) constitute over half of the total population. Russian is the language of the politically dominant group; the central government in Moscow is determined to make it the lingua franca of the realm. How much bilingualism this effort has produced among the Kazakhs is not known. Communist Party authorities frequently complain about the inadequacy of Russian instruction in Kazakh SSR schools. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the proportion of Kazakhs with knowledge of Russian has increased greatly in the last two decades. No quantitative information in this respect is available, but a few generalizations can be made. In general, more Kazakh men than women, and more young people than old, learn the Russian language. One finds proportionately more Russian-speaking Kazakhs in urban areas than in rural (and fewest among the remaining nomadic tribes), and more among those whose social status makes knowledge of Russian a necessity for maintaining that status, such as political and professional leaders and workers in prestige manual occupations such as railroading.

On the other hand, the proportion of Russians in the KSSR who have a good working knowledge of the Kazakh language is probably small. Those who have such knowledge are minor officials, Party functionaries, work foremen, and others who deal with the monolingual Kazakh population in a direct supervisory capacity.

Much more would have to be said about bilingualism in a study of the other four union republics in Soviet Central Asia.[1] The fact that

[1]The Tartars of Turkestan deserve special mention in this context: They owe their important historical position as traders and mediators between the Turks and Russians to their knowledge of languages, high general educational standards (e.g., literacy), and zeal as teachers of Islam. However, it is probable that the influence of this small ethnic group (about 1% in 1926) has declined in the last quarter of a century.

KN 872 Certain other available data add some evidence on this matter. In 1950-1951 the proportions of school children in the total populations of five regions of Kazakhstan were as follows (expressed in percentages): Aktyubinsk, 15.0; Dzhambul, 20.2; East Kazakhstan, 18.3; Guryev, 17.6; and West Kazakhstan, 21.6.[1] Aktyubinsk and Guryev, the regions in K [872] which the school children formed the lowest proportion of the population, are primarily herding regions, populated largely by Kazakhs. Hence these incomplete data tend to support the conclusion that Kazakh children are underrepresented in the schools.

Today the number of people with more education is increasing, but there is no increase in the percentage of children starting school. K 877 The base of the education pyramid has not been enlarged.

Kazakhs resist Soviet education in those areas where education means giving up the traditional Kazakh culture. Even at best the Kazakh children are not being educated in numbers proportional to the total strength of the Kazakhs. This may mean that the Kazakh children are not going to school, or it may mean that some of those who go to school are going to Russian schools. Probably both factors are involved. The K [369] Kazakhs in the cities and in the industrial parts of Kazakhstan are accommodating to Soviet life more quickly than the rural, pastoral Kazakhs. Among the rural Kazakhs the traditional views of Russians, K [569] of schooling, of Sovietization, of the place of women in school and in life are still maintained. In rural regions the Kazakhs would be most reluctant to give their daughters to be trained in ways alien to their own. Their reluctance would be even greater if, for some of them, education meant giving up their native tongue for the Russian language. The literacy figures lend support to this, since literacy and mass education are closely related. In 1939, the last year for which a breakdown of literacy by sex is available, the literacy rate for the entire population of Kazakhstan was 76.3 per cent. The rate for males was 85.2 per cent, and that for females, 65.6 per cent. The traditional Kazakh view that women should be kept in the home and out of public life has not entirely yielded before the plans of the Soviet regime.

K KN 872 KN 563 Few data exist on the quality of instruction and the degree to which education in Kazakhstan is comparable to western standards. Certain conclusions are justified regarding the comparability of language instruction in Russian and Kazakh schools, however. The rate of failures in the higher educational institutions may be used as an index of the quality of the instruction offered in the Kazakh and Russian languages in the lower schools, since the graduates of these institutions become the teachers in the lower schools. In 1952 in Alma-Ata, the rate of failure was almost twice as high among the examinees in the Kazakh language as among those taking the Russian language. The rate of failure was 14.8 per cent in Russian, 27.8 per cent in Kazakh.[2]

The inference that the quality of education offered in the Kazakh language is lower than that given in Russian in Kazakhstan is borne out

[1] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Second edition.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 Sep 52.